# Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity for Algebraic Codes

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Based on joint work with Daniel Augot and Jade Nardi

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- Motivations and context
- Local testers and proofs of proximity
- ▶ IOP of Proximity for Reed-Solomon codes: the FRI protocol
- ▶ IOP of Proximity for multivariate codes

# Motivations and context

# Verifiable computing



**Completeness**: Verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  always accepts valid proof of correct statement

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"short" proofs, "fast" proof generation, "fast" verification

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Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be a **NP** relation,  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{R}) := \{x \mid \exists w, (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}\}.$ 

- Probabilistic verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  has input x and oracle access to a probabilistically checkable proof (PCP)  $\pi$ .
- ▶ **Completeness**: If  $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$ , then  $\mathcal{V}^{\pi}(x)$  accepts with probability 1.
- ▶ **Soundness**: If  $x \notin \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{R})$ , then for all  $\tilde{\pi}$ ,  $\mathcal{V}^{\tilde{\pi}}(x)$  accepts with small proba.

→ Encoding of witnesses so that any PCP of a false statement has **errors almost everywhere**.

Probabilistically checkable proofs are locally testable proofs.

π

PCP Theorem [..., AS92, ALMSS98, ...]

Every problem in **NP** has **polynomial-size** probabilistically checkable proofs verifiable by reading a **constant number of bits**.

[Kilian92, Micali95]

Based on the PCP theorem: there are polylogarithmic-size non-interactive arguments for NP (in the ROM).

Notable application of probabilistic proof systems (PCPs, IPs, and variants): **super fast verification of long computations**.

Arithmetization: Reduce computational problem (captured by relation *R*) to an algebraic problem involving low-degree polynomials over F so that:

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• On input (x, w), Prover  $\mathcal{P}$  computes a PCP  $\pi$  for the statement " $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$ ". Roughly speaking,  $\pi$  is an encoding of w using low-degree polynomial functions.

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- Verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  asks for certain symbols of  $\pi$  and (probabilistically) checks:

**Consistency test:** the message associated to  $\pi$  is consistent with (\*), **Proximity test:**  $\pi$  is close to a certain polynomial code *C*.

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In practice, oracles are replaced by cryptographic commitments (Merkle trees)





opening at a single location = log(|oracle|) hashes

commit = 1 hash

Local testers and proofs of proximity

Given some domain D, a (linear) code  $C \subseteq \mathbb{F}^D$  is a  $\mathbb{F}$ -vector space of functions from D to  $\mathbb{F}$ .



Codes with sublinear local testers are **locally testable codes**.

DEF Multivariate polynomial codes

Let  $L \subseteq \mathbb{F}$  and d < |L|.

#### Tensor product of RS codes:

 $\mathsf{RS}[L,d]^{\otimes m} = \{f : L^m \to \mathbb{F} \mid f \text{ evaluation of a poly in } \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_m] \text{ with individual degrees } < d\}$ 

Reed-Muller codes:

 $\mathsf{RM}[L, d, m] = \{f : L^m \to \mathbb{F} \mid f \text{ evaluation of a poly in } \mathbb{F}[X_1, \dots, X_m] \text{ of total degree } < d\}$ 

Remark: We consider m-wise tensor products to simplify the presentation.





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Most works on probabilistic proof systems use multivariate polynomials.

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#### Probabilistically Checkable Proof of Proximity (PCPP):



- Relevant measures: prover time, verifier time, proof length, query complexity
- For multivariate codes: PCPs of Proximity enable constant query complexity, but prover time is too high for interesting applications.
- > Also enable proximity testing with sublinear query complexity for non-locally testable codes
  - e.g. Reed-Solomon codes [BS08]

### Interactive oracle proofs of proximity





Relevant measures: prover time, proof length, verifier time, query complexity, round complexity



**Without** help from a prover: d + 1 **queries are necessary** and sufficient.

**DEF Reed-Solomon code** Given domain  $L \subseteq \mathbb{F}$ , degree bound d < |L|,  $RSL, d := \{f_{|L} : L \to \mathbb{F} \mid f \in \mathbb{F}[X], \deg f < d\}.$ 

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FRI protocol [BBHR18]

IOP of Proximity for RS[L, d] where L is a subgroup of  $(\mathbb{F}, +)$  or  $(\mathbb{F}^{\times}, \times)$  of large smooth order with

logarithmic query complexity,

(with respect to |L|)

- ▶ logarithmic verifier,
- ▶ linear prover.

The FRI protocol is a crucial building-block of some proof systems deployed in the real-world with **post-quantum security** and **no trusted setup** ("Stark" proofs [BBHR19]).

	Code	Prover	Verifier	Query	Length	Rounds
[BBHR18]	RS	< 8N	$< 8 \log N$	$< 2 \log N$	< N	$< \log N$
[A <mark>B</mark> N21]	$RS^{\otimes m}$	< 8N	$< 8 \log N$	$< 2 \log N$	< N	$< \log N$
[A <mark>B</mark> N21]	RM	< (2m + 7)N	$< 2^m \left(rac{5}{4} + rac{7}{m} ight) \log N$	$< \frac{2^m}{m} \log N$	$< \frac{N}{2^m-1}$	$< \frac{\log N}{m}$

Inspired from the **FRI** protocol, we can construct **interactive oracle proofs of proximity** (IOPP) for multivariate polynomial codes that are **fast to generate** and **exponentially faster to verify**.

Block length is *N*, number of variables is *m*.

Complexities counted in  $\mathbb F\text{-}\mathsf{ops}$  and field elements.

Remark: regarding SNARKs applications, constant rate codes  $\rightarrow$  shorter proofs (m = constant)

IOP of Proximity for Reed-Solomon codes: the FRI protocol

Assume  $\mathbb{F}$  has a multiplicative subgroup L of order  $2^n$ ,  $char(\mathbb{F}) \neq 2$ . The square map  $q: x \mapsto x^2$  is 2-to-1 from L to q(L).

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Reduce proximity to  $RS[L, d] \rightarrow proximity$  to RS[q(L), d/2].

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Given arbitrary function f : L \to \mathbb{F},

• Decompose f into two parts:

f(x) = g_0(x^2) + xg_1(x^2) where \deg g_i \le \frac{\deg f}{2}.
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If deg f < d, then
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• For z \in \mathbb{F}, define Fold [f, z] : q(L) \to \mathbb{F} by

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How to compute Fold [f, z]? Any  $y \in q(L)$  has 2 distinct square roots  $x, -x \in L$ . Linear system  $\implies g_0(y) = \frac{f(x)+f(-x)}{2}$  and  $g_1(y) = \frac{f(x)-f(-x)}{2x}$ . Key properties of folding operators

1. Completeness:

 $f \in \mathsf{RS}[L,d] \implies \mathsf{Fold}[f,z] \in \mathsf{RS}[q(L),d/2]$  for all  $z \in \mathbb{F}$ .

2. Local computability:

Each entry of Fold [f, z] depends on only 2 entries of f, and is computable in O(1) field operations.

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#### 3. Distance preservation:

f is far from RS[L, d]  $\implies$  Fold [f, z] is far from RS[q(L), d/2] w.h.p. over z.

Distance and random combinations [RVW13, AHIV17, BBHR18, BKS18, BGKS20, BCIKS20]

Let  $V \subseteq \mathbb{F}^L$  be a linear code,  $g_0, g_1 \in \mathbb{F}^L$ , and  $\delta \in (0, \delta_0)$ . Assume either  $g_0$  or  $g_1$  is  $\delta$ -far from V. Then  $g_0 + zg_1$  is  $\approx \delta$ -far from V w.h.p. over z. ( $\delta_0$  const. depends on distance of V)





### **Global consistency test:**

Sample  $s \in L$  and check  $f_1(s^2) \stackrel{?}{=} \operatorname{Fold} [f_0, z_0] (s^2)$ 

 $f_2(s^4) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{Fold} [f_1, z_1] (s^4)$ 

$$f_r(s^{2^r}) \stackrel{?}{=} \operatorname{Fold} [f_{r-1}, z_{r-1}](s^{2^r})$$
  
Final test:  $f_r \stackrel{?}{=} c \in \mathbb{F}$ 





#### Folding preserves distance to the code

Soundness of FRI [BBHR18, BKS18, BGKS20, BCIKS20]

Let  $\varepsilon, \delta > 0$  such that  $\varepsilon < \sqrt{\rho}/20$  and  $\delta < 1 - \sqrt{\rho} - \varepsilon$ . Suppose f is  $\delta$ -far from RS[L, d]. Then, after t repetitions of the QUERY phase,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{V} \text{ accepts}] \leq \underbrace{\frac{d^2}{(2\varepsilon)^7 |\mathbb{F}|}}_{\text{err}_{\text{commit}}} + \underbrace{(1-\delta)^t}_{\text{err}_{\text{query}}}.$$

 $\left(\rho = \frac{d}{|L|}\right)$ 

IOPs of Proximity for multivariate codes

• Start by folding along the first dimension:





> Write 
$$f:\prod_{i=1}^m L_i o \mathbb{F}$$
 as

$$f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) = g_0(x_1^2, x_2, \dots, x_m) + x_1g_1(x_1^2, x_2, \dots, x_m)$$



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For z ∈ F, define Fold [f, z] : q(L<sub>1</sub>) × Π<sup>m</sup><sub>i=2</sub> L<sub>i</sub> → F by
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☑ Completeness ☑ Local computability ☑ Distance preservation

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The folding of  $f: L^m \to \mathbb{F}$  w.r.t  $z \in \mathbb{F}^m$  is a function

Fold  $[f, z] : q(L)^m \to \mathbb{F}$ 

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**Local computability** (with  $l = 2^m$ )

**Distance preservation** 

[ABN21]

Distance-preserving folding operators for each code of a sequence of codes  $(C_i)_{0 \le i \le r}$  $\implies$  IOP of Proximity for the code  $C_0$ .

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Distance-preserving folding operators for each code of a sequence of codes  $(C_i)_{0 \le i \le r}$  $\implies$  IOP of Proximity for the code  $C_0$ .

THEOREM [ABN21]		
$RS[L,d]^{\otimes m}$ has an IOPP $(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{V})$ satisfying		
# rounds # queries prover time verifier time proof length	$= \log d^{m}$ $= 2 \log d^{m} + 1$ $\leq 8  L^{m} $ $\leq 8 \log d^{m}$ $\leq  L^{m} $	

THEOREM [ADM21]		
$RM[L,d,m]$ has an IOPP $(\mathcal{P},\mathcal{V})$ satisfying		
f # rounds	$= \log d$	
# queries	$=2^m\log d+1$	
prover time	$<(2m+7) L^{m} $	
verifier time	$<2^m(\frac{5}{4}m+7)(\log d)$	
proof length	$<  L^m /(2^m-1)$	

Remark: we also need  $L \subset \mathbb{F}$  to be a multiplicative or additive subgroup of  $\mathbb{F}$ .

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#### Thank you!